Reassessing the Soviet stand on the Indo-China conflict

In this connection it is interesting to draw attention to another document – a report dated December 18, 1959 drafted by Mikhail Suslov, CPSU ideologue in charge of relations with fraternal communist parties about the visit of Soviet party and government delegation led by Nikita Khrushchev to China in October 1959. The document recalls  that Suslov after criticising Beijing’s actions  in exacerbating  international relations, Mao’s  thesis  that imperialists were paper tigers, China’s cavalier  attitude towards  nuclear war  addressed  Sino-Indian relations  and the border clashes  at Longju  and Kongka in 1959. Suslov is quoted as berating the Chinese for the May 1959 People’s Daily article under the title “The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy” in the document.

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Suslov writes, “Nehru is a well-known politician. One cannot rule out that to some degree he was involved in the intrigues against the PRC.  But Nehru is far-sighted enough to recognise the vital importance of India’s friendship with China, with the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp.  Nehru behaved with reserve. In his numerous speeches, he admitted that Tibet is a part of China, he spoke against the establishment of a so-called ‘Government of Dalai Lama in exile,’ stressing the significance of Sino-Indian friendship. India repeatedly raised the issue of restoration of rights of the PRC in the UNO. Precisely these actions made the rightist bourgeois circles in India, who are linked to Anglo-American capital to assail Nehru…. If these reactionary circles in India succeed, it would cause serious damage to the socialist camp and the entire cause of peace, since the present foreign policy line of the Nehru government is a positive factor in the struggle for strengthening peace.”

Suslov then goes on to ask “what objectives did Chinese comrades pursue in attacking Nehru so uncompromisingly?” Suslov ridicules a view expressed  by his Chinese interlocutors which visualised  the possibility of the downfall of the Nehru government and saw no great trouble if a reactionary pro-Western government  came to power in India because that would bring closer a revolution  in India. Suslov notes that CPI General Secretary Ajay Ghosh also admitted his inability to explain   China’s position on McMahon Line or why the PRC was letting itself to be pulled by “Indian reaction into the border conflict. Suslov then goes on to describe Chinese actions as directed not only against India but also against the USSR, since they embarrassed  Khrushchev on the eve of  his own long –awaited   Summit  with President Eisenhower in USA.

Suslov report too gives an account of the discussions on India at Khrushchev’s summit meeting with Mao on October 2, 1959, where all the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of Chinese Communist Party were present. The Suslov report says that Khrushchev “told the Chinese comrades that we do not  completely  understand their foreign policy, particularly  with regard  to India …The Soviet leader complained that as China’s ally  the Soviet side did not know what the Chinese may undertake  tomorrow  in the area of foreign policy…The Report says that that the Chinese side in their reply claimed  that their  line towards Nehru was correct  adding that” at times  the tone of our discussion became quite sharp. It came to the point when Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi claimed that our line on Nehru is opportunistic and the policy of China is more firm and correct. “We gave a resolute rebuff to these pronouncements, writes Suslov, without providing any details. A careful reading of the report would indicate that Beijing’s policy towards India was putting the Soviet leaders in an impossible dilemma – either to support what they believed as Mao’s adventurist actions for the sake of an increasingly illusory Sino-Soviet alliance undermining Moscow’s growing ties with India and the West or to take a balanced stand at the risk of an open split with Chinese leadership.

The Soviet approach to the Chinese invasion of India in October 1962  was in the beginning reflected  in CPSU mouthpiece ‘Pravda,’ dated October 25, 1962 which said “Soviet people hold the firm view that in the present situation, the main thing is to stop the fighting and start talks on peaceful resolution of the conflict… Such a decision would correspond to the interests of both Indian and Chinese people and would serve the cause of preservation of peace and in Asia and in the whole world. However, the Chinese leadership ignoring this appeal continued their invasion.

At this stage of the Indo-China border conflict , Soviet policy was influenced by the Cuban missile crisis in which the US and the Soviet Union had  locked their horns  in the worst ever confrontation of the Cold War period. Khrushchev sent a letter to Pandit Nehru urging him to accept Zhou En-lie’s offer for cease fire and talks. The Soviet Union also suspended the supplies of MiG fighters under the agreement reached between the two sides in August 1962. It was a clear tilt towards China, which has to be understood in the backdrop of the Cuban missile crisis that reached its peak at this time, and Moscow was ostensibly striving to secure Chinese support against US designs. The Indian ambassador to Soviet Union T.N. Kaul too attests this view. Ambassador Kaul in his memoirs writes, “Their (Soviet Attitude) attitude at the end of October, 1962 was not even neutral but slightly tilted in favour of China, and this was, as Khrushchev explained to me later, due to the fact  that the Cuban crisis was at its height and the Soviet Union could not  afford to relax  its combat readiness for a possible conflict with  the USA over Cuba.”

That the tilt was temporary became clear from Khrushchev’s statement to the Supreme Soviet in December 1962, when he reverted to a position of neutrality on the Indo-China conflict and ordered the release of MiG fighter planes.

As the Cuban missile crisis subsided, Moscow slowly but surely started supporting India in its conflict with China. Kaul in this context writes, “As further time went by and India showed a spirit of determination to resist China’s aggression, the Soviets were impressed. Their attitude became more sympathetic to India, both in their public statements and even more so, in their private conversations.”   This was the first time in history that a socialist country supported a developing country in its fight against another socialist state. This snowballed Sino-Soviet differences, which gradually came out in the open. As Khrushchev confided to Kaul, one of the reasons for differences between China and Soviet Union was Soviet friendship with India.

The Soviets never wanted the Sino-Indian conflict to escalate and advised both sides to find a peaceful political solution to the border dispute through negotiations. They were also watching how India would emerge from the conflict and how China and the West would react. The declaration of  ‘unilateral cease-fire’  by China was in Soviet eyes  a recognition  by China  of India’s unity  and potential strength,  the realisation by China of India’s unity and potential strength, the realisation by China that she had gone too far and had extended her lines of communication, without being able to support them. They were expecting India to go down on its knees and beg for peace. When this did not happen and they saw the unity and determination of India to resist, they made a virtue out of necessity by declaring an unilateral cease-fire.

Ambassador Kaul in this context writes in his memoirs that as told by Soviet leaders, they were impressed by India’s determination not to give in to the aggressor. The Soviets, perhaps, had under-estimated India’s potential, at first, but were impressed with Nehru’s adherence to the policy of non-alignment. They also saw the attempts of the West to turn India against them and India’s refusal to do so. Both India and the Soviet Union found common ground in the danger from the Sino-Pak axis which would pose a threat not only to India, but also to the Soviet Union’s southern underbelly. Pakistan had already joined US-propped military alliances like SEATO and CENTO, and India had refused to do so. The Soviet Union realised that a strong, stable, non-aligned India, friendly to the USSR, is important for Moscow’s own security. This turned out to be the time when Delhi and Moscow laid solid foundations for a meaningful and productive defence cooperation that now constitutes one of the major pillars of their special and privileged strategic partnership. Prime Minister Nehru had appealed the US leadership for military assistance which did not come forth. The Soviet Union showed readiness to fill the critical gaps in India’s defence, which was widened by US-Pak alliance.

Thus Soviet stand on Indo-China conflict that evolved from a position of neutrality to a brief tilt in favour of China and then to open support for India, both politically and materially was very significant. This was the first instance when a communist country supported a non-communist country in its conflict with another communist state. The conflict was a serious test of India’s non-aligned policy that stood the test of time. It was established that non-alignment does not mean maintaining equidistance and spurning friendship of a neighbour who might be ideologically different but has commonality of interests with us. For the Soviets, it was a vindication of Khrushchev’s strategy of peaceful co-existence with the non-communist world that was not approved by China.         

The writer is a professor at the JNU School of International Studies and heads the New Delhi-based Eurasian Foundation.